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Utilitarian voting (UV) is defined in this paper as any voting rule that allows the voter to rank 
all of the alternatives by means of the scores permitted under a given voting scale. Specific 
UV rules that have been proposed are approval voting, allowing the scores 0, 1; range voting, 
allowing all numbers in an interval as scores; evaluative voting, allowing the scores -1, 0, 1.  
 The paper deals extensively with Arrow’s impossibility theorem that has been interpreted 
as precluding a satisfactory voting mechanism. I challenge the relevance of the ordinal 
framework in which that theorem is expressed and argue that instead utilitarian, i.e. cardinal 
social choice theory is relevant for voting. I show that justifications of both utilitarian social 
choice and of majority rule can be modified to derive UV. The most elementary derivation of 
UV is based on the view that no justification exists for restricting voters’ freedom to rank the 
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Under utilitarian voting (UV) a voter can score each alternative with one of the scores 
permitted by a given voting scale. There is no further restriction on how the alternatives may 
be scored. Three specific utilitarian voting methods have been proposed: approval voting 
(AV), evaluative voting (EV) and range voting RV. While these will be discussed, the main 
focus of the paper is on utilitarian voting generally. I argue that UV is superior to traditional 
voting rules that restrict how alternatives may be scored. 
 Any claim regarding the superiority of a voting rule, or class of such rules, must 
confront Arrow’s claim, expressed in his impossibility theorem, that no satisfactory method of 
collective choice can exist. That Arrows theorem precludes the existence of a satisfactory 
voting rule appears still to be the dominant view among voting theorists. In their introduction 
to a recent symposium on voting theory, Levin and Nalebuff (1995, p.3) put it as follows: 
 
 One can speculate on why alternatives to plurality rule have had such a difficult time being adopted. 
Part of the cause may be Arrow’s general possibility theorem. Arrow (1951) demonstrates that any voting 
system applied to an unrestricted collection of voter preferences must have some serious defects; we must 
always choose between flawed alternatives. 
 
 A large literature on Arrow’s conditions exits, but has not produced a successful challenge to 
the impossibility theorem. This paper takes a different approach. My starting point is the 
recognition that any mathematical theory, or formalism, is first of all no more than that. The 
claim that the formalism is about an empirical phenomenon, such as collective choice, can 
only be substantiated by examining the conceptualization that led to the formalism. Arrow 
formalized the problem of social choice by assuming that individuals have weak preference 
orderings over socially relevant alternatives. Let iR  be the preference ordering of the ith 
voter, i=1,…,N and R the corresponding social ordering. The problem of social choice is then 
formalized as that of finding a suitable mapping ( )1: ,..., .NO R R R→  I refer to this type of 
mappings as ordinal. Formal social choice procedures that are in actual use, including voting 
procedures are not ordinal. Instead, they are mappings from sets of numbers to a set of 
numbers. Let  be the vote of the ith voter and  the score he gives to 
alternative j. The aggregate vote is 
( 1, ,i i iJv s s= ⋅⋅⋅ ) ijs
( )1, , Jv s s= ⋅⋅⋅ , with js  the aggregate score for alternative 
j. The mapping  is cardinal. Each cardinal mapping implies an ordinal 
mapping, but since an infinity of cardinal mappings imply the same ordinal mapping, the 
reverse implication does not exist.  
( )1: ,..., NC v v v→
 There is no logical reason why ordinal conditions should not be applied to cardinal 
mappings. However, the fact that all voting procedures are cardinal, should at least raise the 
question of the relevance of ordinal conditions. 
 The paper has the following structure: Section 2 asks of how the problem of voting should 
be conceptualized. This includes the question of what other activities voting is related to and 
how these have been structured. Theories relevant to voting are also reviewed. I argue that 
prima facie the utilitarian theory of collective choice, rather than the ordinal theory is 
relevant. Some basic definitions required subsequently are given in Section 3. Section 4 gives 
a simple and pragmatic derivation of UV. It is based on the idea that lifting the restrictions on 
the scoring of the alternatives that characterize traditional voting methods leads directly to 
UV. Section 5 examines the arguments advanced by Arrow and in the subsequent literature in 
favor of the ordinal approach. The lack of progress in both social choice and voting theories is 
examined in Section 6 and attributed to faulty conceptualizations in both cases. Section 7 
examines both Arrow’s conditions and the Condorcet criterion in the context of UV. In all 
fields other than voting, the aggregation of judgments proceeds by freely attaching scores 
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from a given scale to the objects being evaluated. In Section 8 I argue that voting should 
follow this example. Section 9 describes UV as being simply an application of traditional 
utilitarianism. Section 10 argues that rational delegates to a constitutional convention would 
unanimously opt for UV. Section 11 examines May’s derivation of majority rule and 
d’Aspremont and Grevers’ derivation of utilitarian collective choice and show that both can 
be used to justify UV. The framework can also be used to relate other voting methods to the 
theory of decision making under uncertainty. It is shown in particular that plurality voting 
(PV) corresponds to maximizing the probability of the largest gain, irrespective of the risk. 
Preference distortion and strategic voting with traditional voting methods are discussed in 
Section 12. The choice between the three UV methods that have been proposed is discussed in 
Section 13. Utilitarian voting in the historical Republic of Venice is the subject of Section 14. 
The paper concludes with a call for the empirical study of alternative voting methods. 
2. HOW SHOULD THE PROBLEM OF VOTING BE CONCEPTUALIZED? 
In voting theory as well as in the more abstract theory of collective choice, the problem is 
usually described as being that of the aggregation of preferences. Just what ‘preference’ 
means is usually not elaborated. Before turning to this issue, it is useful to point out that for 
Condorcet who stood at the beginning of the mathematical theory of voting, as well as for 
earlier theorists, the problem was that of choosing the correct alternative, for example the best 
qualified candidate. This was viewed as a cognitive problem rather than as one of subjective 
preference.1
 ‘Preference’ refers to a choice between alternatives. If an individual chooses an alternative 
a over b, that means that he expects the subjective experience that results from the choice of a 
to be superior to that resulting from the choice of b. An expectation is always more or less 
uncertain, even if the experience follows directly upon the choice. In the case of political 
elections the uncertainty is very large. The voter is uncertain about how a politician, once 
elected, will act; he is also uncertain about the consequences of various actions; finally, he 
cannot be sure in advance of how a given outcome will affect his psychological state of well 
being. I will sometimes refer to individuals’ evaluations of alternatives as ‘judgments’, rather 
than ‘preferences’, the reason being that the former term is more general and can be applied to 
situations in which it would be inappropriate to speak of preference. For example, teachers 
rate students in relation to their grasp of some subject matter. The note given reflects the 
teacher’s judgment, not his preference in the sense of, for example, his liking a particular 
student better than another. When notes are aggregated, over exams to give a final grade, or 
over course grades to determine if a student qualifies for graduation, this is an aggregation of 
judgments. In deciding how to aggregate judgments in a given field, such as voting, it is of 
interest to study the aggregation of judgments in other fields and this will be done in the 
present paper. 
 In addition to looking directly at how the aggregation of judgments is actually performed 
in different fields, it is clearly desirable to look at existing theories of how such aggregations 
should be performed. In the voting context, voting theory and the theory of collective choice 
are obviously relevant. In relation to the latter, we should deal with the fact that there are two 
broad theories, the ordinal theory in the mold of Arrow and the cardinal theory associated 
most prominently with the work of Harsanyi.2 These may also be termed the ‘negative’ and 
the ‘positive’ theories, since Arrow presented an impossibility result, while the cardinal 
theorists presented consistent sets of axioms. While the ordinal theory has dominated voting 
theory, a principal claim of the present paper is that the cardinal theory is relevant for voting. 
                                                 
1 Early voting theory is discussed and the most important documents are reproduced in McLean and Urken 
(1995). 
2 Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1976). 
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3. SOME DEFINITIONS 
Let  be the score given by the ith voter to the jth alternative, ijs 1, , , 1, ,i N j J= ⋅⋅⋅ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ . The 
scores are real numbers in a specified interval: ijS s S≤ ≤ . The interval defined by the upper 
and lower bounds is a voting scale ( ),VS S S= . A particular VS may involve further 
restrictions on admissible scores; these will be discussed presently. The ballot of the ith voter 
is the vector of scores he gives to the alternatives: ( )1, ,i i iJb s s= ⋅⋅⋅ . The total score of the jth 
alternative is . The total vote is the vector j is =∑ ijs ( )1, , Jb s s= ⋅⋅⋅ . Alternative h will be a 
winner if and only if  for all j. ,h js s≥
 The above definitions cover virtually all voting methods, except for the fact that traditional 
methods place restrictions on how the scores made available by a given voting scale may be 
used. Thus, plurality voting has the two permissible scores, (0,1), and the restriction that the 1 
can be assigned to only one alternative, 0 being assigned to the rest. Such voting methods will 
be termed restricted. All non restricted voting methods are will be termed utilitarian, this 
terminology being taken from collective choice theory. 
 The best known utilitarian voting method is approval voting (AV) for which VS = (0,1). 
For scale voting (SC) a score can be any real number such that ijS s S≤ ≤ . Evaluative voting, 
advocated by the present author, has VS = (-1, 0, 1). I will compare these alternatives, in 
Section 13, but the main focus of the paper is on utilitarian voting in general. 
4. THREE CONDITIONS THAT IMPLY UV 
This section contains a simple, pragmatic argument for UV. It is based on the idea that UV 
results simply from the lifting of restrictions imposed by traditional voting methods. More 
formally: 
 
Condition Use of a Voting Scale (UVS): A voting method must be based on a voting scale as 
defined  above. 
Condition Cardinal Aggregation (CA): The outcome of an election must be based on cardinal 
aggregation ,i.e., the simple sums of scores for the various alternatives. 
Condition Voter Sovereignty (VS): A voting rule must allow for voter sovereignty, so that each 
voter is free to assign to any alternative any of the scores provided by the voting scale. 
 
The three conditions define UV. 
 I can think of no argument against voter sovereignty and am unaware of any in the 
literature. This simple derivation is therefore quite powerful. 
5. IS THERE A CASE FOR ORDINAL COLLECTIVE CHOICE? 
The argument for ordinal social choice is generally expressed in terms of the alleged 
impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Arrow formulated it thus: 
 
The viewpoint will be taken here that interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, 
that there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility. The 
controversy is well-known and hardly need be recited here. During the entire controversy, the proponents 
of measurable utility have been unable to produce any proposition of economic behavior which could be 
explained by their hypothesis and not by those of the indifference-curve theorists. 1 Indeed, the only 
meaning the concepts of utility can be said to have is their indications of actual behavior, and, if any 
course of behavior can be explained by a given utility function, it has been amply demonstrated that such 
a course of behavior can be equally well explained by any other utility function which is a strictly 
increasing function of the first. If we cannot have measurable utility, in this sense, we cannot have 
interpersonal comparability of utilities a fortiori. (Arrow, 1963, 1951, p.9). 
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 Arrow is here referring to the static theory of consumer choice. Subsequent passages deal 
with the cardinal utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Arrow states that, since this 
theory is about an individual’s choice among uncertain prospects, it is irrelevant to social 
choice. That is correct, but applies equally to the theory of consumer choice under certainty. 
The fact that this theory can do without cardinal utility has no implication for collective 
choice. 
 In a later section of his book Arrow explicitly considered additive utility and argued that it 
cannot serve as the basis of collective choice. He considers a choice between three 
alternatives and assumes that the individual utility functions are normalized so that the most 
preferred alternative gets a 1, the least preferred a 0. 
 
It is not hard to see that the suggested assignment of utilities is  extremely unsatisfactory. Suppose there 
are altogether three alternatives and three individuals. Let two of the individuals have the utility 1 for 
alternative x, .9 for y, and 0 for z; and let the third individual have the utility 1 for y, .5 for x and 0 for z. 
According to the above criterion, y is preferred to x. Clearly, z is a very undesirable alternative since each 
individual regards it as worst. If z were blotted out of existence, it should not make any difference to the 
final outcome; yet, under the proposed rule for assigning utilities to alternatives, doing so would cause the 
first two individuals to have utility 1 for x and 0 for y, while the third individual has utility 0 for x and 1 
for y, so that the ordering by sum of utilities would cause x to be preferred to y. (p. 3). 
 
 This argument illustrates a fundamental blind spot in the work of Arrow and in collective 
choice theory that followed in his foot steps. It is the failure to recognize the possibility of 
measuring along an independent scale. Suppose the voting procedure used is range voting, 
the VS being the interval (0, 1). Then, under sincere voting, assumed by Arrow throughout, 
each alternative would have a defined value in this interval, independently of other 
alternatives. Alternatively, consider approval voting. An alternative in the interval (0, 5) on 
the voter’s subjective utility scale would receive a 0 AV score, one in the interval (.5, 1) 
would receive a 1. Addition or removal of other alternatives would not change these scores. 
 There is another related blindness. It would appear that the primary challenge for anyone 
who argues against cardinal social choice is to confront it directly. The seminal contribution is 
Harsanyi (1955). In the second (1963) edition of his book, Arrow has the new Chapter 8 
dealing with developments since the first edition; there is no mention of Harsanyi’s work. 
Arrow gave a summary of his work at a symposium on Human Values and Economic Policy 
participated by economists and philosophers (Hook, 1967). Neither his, nor any other 
contribution mentions Harsanyi. Oddly, Samuelson (1967) in his comment on Arrow’s paper 
conjectures that an impossibility theorem similar to that of Arrow can be proven for cardinal 
aggregation also! 
 Arrow was actually Harsanyi’s thesis advisor at Stanford University in 1956-58. In a 
glowing foreword to Harsanyi’s (1976) collected papers Arrow writes: 
 
When John Harsanyi came to Stanford University as a candidate for the Ph.D., I asked him why he was 
bothering, since it was most unlikely that he had anything to learn from us. He was already a known 
scholar; in addition to some papers in economics, the first two papers in this volume had already been 
published and had dazzled me by their originality and their combination of philosophical insight and 
technical competence. (p.vii).The two papers referred to include the 1955 classic already mentioned. 
Regarding Harsanyi’s contribution to social choice, Arrow writes: 
Harsanyi has maintained consistently the importance of founding ethics as well as descriptive social 
science on the basis of the rational behavior of society and of individuals. The result has been a vigorous 
defense, rehabilitation, and reinterpretation of classical utilitarianism. In particular, Harsanyi introduced 
the ideal of considering the choice of an ethical criterion in a hypothetical situation where individuals do 
not know who they are or what their interests will be (this approach was used independently and 
somewhat later by John Rawls, under the now widely-used term, 'original position'; it has also been 
introduced independently and somewhat earlier by William Vickrey). Hence, the social rule amounts to 
maximizing under uncertainty. (p. vii). 
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 Arrow is apparently willing to let ordinal and cardinal theories co-exist, even though he 
had denied the possibility of the latter to exist in any meaningful way. 
 A convincing rationale for the adoption of ordinalism cannot be found in the work of 
Arrow, nor as far as I can see anywhere else. What was the actual motivation? In his survey of 
social choice theory, Sen (1986) has this to say: 
 
No approach to welfare economics has received as much support over the years as utilitarianism. If 
 is the utility function of person i defined for each person i=1,…,n, over the set X of alternative 
social states, then on the utilitarian approach any state x is at least as good as another y, denoted x R y, if 
and only if . 
( )iU ⋅
( ) ( )1 1n ni ii iU x U y= =≥∑ ∑
 It is clear that utilitarianism uses cardinality and interpersonal comparability of utilities. Both these 
practices received .severe reprimand in the 1930's, with the rebuke drawing sustenance from a single-
minded concern with basing utility information on non-verbal behavior only, dealing with choices in the 
absence of risk. It thus appeared that social welfare must be based on just the n-tuple of ordinal, 
interpersonally non-comparable, individual utilities. This informational restriction would, of course, make 
the traditional utilitarian approach -and a great many other procedures -unworkable. (p.1073-4). 
 
 Sen is here referring to the influential book of Robbins (1932). Robbins pointed out that all 
social or economic policies, not based on the equivalent criteria of Pareto optimality or 
unanimous decision making, involve value judgments that compare the gains and losses of 
different individuals; interpersonal comparisons of utility in the parlance of economists. He 
stated further that there was no scientific foundation for value judgments. Therefore, 
economists cannot make any policy recommendations and claim scientific validity for them. 
The literature dealing with values in relation in relation to social science and policy, as well as 
in relation to science generally is in fact vast. Robbins’ position was directly challenged by 
the Nobel Prize winning economist Gunnar Myrdal (1958, 1970). According to Myrdal, the 
answer to the problem raised by Robbins is to make the value judgments that enter into social 
policies explicit. Policy decisions always involve assumptions about cause and effect. 
Therefore, there is a role for scientific analysis of policy decisions even if we accept Robbins’ 
position that value judgments cannot be scientific. Further more, value judgments are 
certainly capable of being debated. Religious leaders and philosophers have done this for 
millennia. More recently, it has been a subject for psychologists and, as Layard (2005) ploints 
out, values are increasingly being studied by the methods of the natural sciences also. 
 For the purpose of the present paper it suffices to point out that Robbinns’ argument is not 
about voting. A vote aggregates the preferences of the voters. These may be influenced by the 
pronouncements of economists and others, but the voter is the ultimate arbiter of their 
validity. There is no logical link from Robbins’ position to that of Arrow who excluded 
utilitarian voting on the ground that the interpersonal comparison of utilities is impossible. 
 One can also make a positive argument to the effect that the avoidance of interpersonal 
utility comparisons is impossible. Any non-unanimous social decision involves gainers and 
losers and thus implies at least an implicit judgment that the gains outweigh the losses. 
Scientific analysis can help in devising suitable rules for aggregating preferences. If this were 
not the case, the continued existence of departments of economics and of political science 
seems hard to justify. 
6. THE PROBLEM WITH COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND VOTING THEORIES 
The formal theory of voting has existed for about 200 years, the more abstract theory of 
collective choice for about half a century. Both traditions have produced large and highly 
formal literatures. If we define progress as agreement on successively superior methods of 
voting and other methods of collective choice, then it would appear that no progress has been 
made. Plurality voting is still the standard and, though theorists agree on its defects, no 
agreement on a superior method has been arrived at. In my view, this rather uniquely negative 
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record is a result of premature formalization and concomitant lack of attention to the 
conceptualization of the empirical problems that motivated the theories in the first place. In 
the case of collective choice theory the mistake was the fixation on an ordinal representation. 
The problem with voting theories is that the different voting methods that are analyzed are 
based on inferior generalizations from the case of two alternatives, i.e., majority rule (MR). If 
the voter chooses one alternative out of two, it seems plausible to let him choose one out of 
many, which is PV. An alternative generalization is the Borda count (BC), which has the 
voting scale . MR is equivalent to BC in case of two alternatives. Finally, 
the Condorcet method of pair wise elimination by means of MR is an obvious generalization.  
(0,1, , 1VS J= ⋅⋅⋅ − )
j
)
 I propose a different conceptualization of collective choice as a problem of measurement. 
If preferences, or more generally judgments, are to be aggregated, they must first be 
measured. Measurement universally proceeds by means of scales that exist independently of 
the objects being measured. Given the scale, measurement proceeds without further 
restrictions. Suppose we wish to know of a pile of sticks which are longer than one meter and 
which are shorter. It makes no sense to say that we can ‘allow’ one stick to be longer, but then 
the rest must be shorter. But, this corresponds to the measurement of preference in PV where 
we can choose one alternative and are forced to reject the rest. Lifting this irrational 
restriction, while keeping the two-valued scale, produces AV. 
 Given the long history of voting theory, it is surprising that the first step towards UV, in 
the form of AV, was taken as late as the 1970s and the second step, the introduction of a scale 
with arbitrary divisions, was taken in 2000 with Smith’s paper on RV. 
7. ARROW, CONDORCET AND UTILITARIAN VOTING 
In his review of collective choice theory, Sen (1986, p. 1074) put the difference between 
ordinal and cardinal SWFs succinctly: 
 
It appears that some conditions that look mild – and are indeed satisfied comfortably by utilitarianism 
when translated into its cardinal interpersonally comparable framework – cannot be fulfilled by any rule 
whatsoever that has to base the social ordering on n-tuples of individual orderings. 
 
 The purpose of this section is to make the translation, demonstrating at the same time that 
the conditions are trivially satisfied. My translation is based on Vickrey’s (1960) restatement 
of Arrow’s conditions. 
 
1. Unanimity: . ,ik ij k js s i j s s≥ ∀ ∀ ⇒ ≥ ∀
2. Nondictatorship: There exists no individual i, such that . ih ik h ks s s s> ⇒ >
3. Transitivity: The ordering of the alternatives implied by the vector of the total vote 
( 1, , Js s⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is transitive. 
4. Unrestricted Domain: Each voter can score any alternative with any score permitted by the 
given voting scale. 
5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The total score for any alternative does not depend 
on the scores given to other alternatives. A fortiori this is true of the relationship between the 
scores of two alternatives.  
 
The conditions follow trivially from the definition of UV. This ‘possibility result’ is made 
possible by the fact that UV makes the gains and losses of different voters commensurable by 
measuring them on a voting scale. Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a consequence of the fact 
that he rejects commensurability and thereby any method of choice in the absence of 
unanimity.  
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 Condition 5 also clarifies the relationship between UV and the Condorcet condition. If 
voters consistently vote in accordance with a given voting scale, the UV winner must also win 
any bilateral contest and hence would also be the Condorcet winner. This statement holds 
under sincere voting. In a bilateral contest, voters have a strong incentive to utilize the entire 
scale, in which case the result need not hold. Voters are more likely to vote sincerely in an 
election with multiple candidates. In that case the UV result would be superior to the 
Condorcet result. 
8. THE COMMON SENSE ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIAN VOTING 
In Section 2 I argued that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments. If we look at 
how judgments are aggregated in fields other than voting, we find some startling contrasts. 
There judgments are measured on a fixed scale, added and averaged. This was not done 
because some abstract theory demanded it. It was done because this is the way that 
measurement universally proceeds and no reasonable alternative suggests itself. In 
considering the examples below, I will only describe the scales used. That the numbers 
obtained are added and averaged is true in all cases. 
 Consider first the example that is closest to political voting: surveys of the popularity of 
politicians. Such surveys are conducted in most democratic countries. In the US they are 
conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Respondents are 
asked to rate politicians on a ‘temperature scale’ ranging from 0 to 100. In Germany, 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen uses the ‘Politbarometer’ scale ranging from -5 (very negative) to 
+5 (very positive). 
 Much more common than political surveys are those conducted by firms to measure the 
satisfaction of their customers. The typical scale is discrete and has the values: excellent (+2), 
good (+1), satisfactory (0), poor (-1), bad (-2), or some equivalent descriptive terms, or 
numbers. The scale may be presented directly in numbers, or verbally and then converted to 
numbers.  
 A similar scale is used to measure performance either in scholastic or vocational settings. 
Here a typical scale is: excellent (1), good (2); average (3), poor (4), failing (5). In the 
German system a grade of 0.5 is also sometimes given to denote an exceptional performance. 
These tests may involve multiple levels of aggregation, for example by combining 
examination notes to obtain course notes and then combining these to obtain a grade for the 
entire course of study. Performance ratings illustrate particularly well why I prefer to use the 
term ‘judgment’ rather than ‘preference’, since the examiner is expected to be guided by his 
objective knowledge of the subject matter, not by any kind of preference. 
 In all of the examples cited, there is no restriction as to how the values allowed by a given 
scale may be applied. For example, no one has suggested that in a class of, say, 30 students 
should be rated by the BC, 30 points for the best and 1 for the worst student. The only 
exception is political voting. I have never seen any explicit justification for violating voter 
sovereignty in this manner and believe that non exits. 
9. THE UTILITARIAN TRADITION AND VOTING 
Beginning with the early utilitarians, particularly Bentham and J. S. Mill, utilitarianism 
provided the generally accepted ethical foundation of economics and much of social thought. 
The basic utilitarian position is that the aim of social policy should be the maximization of the 
population’s total utility, defined as the sum of individual utilities. Utilitarians were 
convinced of the measurability of utility in principle, but did not progress in operationalizing 
this view.  
 It is not my purpose here to review the vast literature pro and con utilitarianism. Instead I 
limit myself to describing the connection between voting and utilitarian social choice theory. 
It depends on 
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Condition Cardinal Utility: The scores by means of which voters express their preferences on 
an appropriate voting scale can be interpreted as their cardinal utilities regarding the 
relevant alternatives. 
 Given this condition, it follows that UV is the utilitarian solution to the voting problem. 
Let  be the score of the ith voter for the jth alternative. If  is the winning alternative, then 







 Accepting utilitarianism as the relevant ethical postulate is, in connection with this 
condition sufficient to establish UV. 
10. DERIVING THE VOTING RULE FROM BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE 
A persistent theme of both religion and ethics throughout the ages has been that ethical 
behavior is not narrowly self-centered, but involves an emphatic identification with others. 
This idea was formalized by both Rawls (1958, 1971) and Harsanyi (1955, 1976). Rawls has 
been justifiably criticized for employing the minimax rule, while Harsanyi uses the standard 
assumption of expected utility maximization. While adopting Harsanyi’s formal argument, I 
interpret it differently. 
 Harsanyi postulates that when an individual decides behind the veil of ignorance he 
assumes that in a future situation of collective decision making he could, with equal 
probability, be one of the other members of society involved in that decision. The following 
quotation (Harsanyi, 1976, Ch. II, p.22, footnote 16) makes this clear: 
 
Or rather, if he had an equal chance of being ‘put in place of’ any individual member of the society, with 
regard not only to his objective social (and economic) conditions, but also to his subjective attitudes and 
tastes. In other words, he ought to judge the utility of another individual’s position not in terms of his own 
attitudes and tastes but rather in terms of the attitudes and tastes of the individual actually holding this 
position. 
 
When Harsanyi goes on to postulate that an individual maximizes his expected utility under 
the assumption just described, he is not using the conventional assumption of maximizing 
ones own expected utility. Harsanyi here squeezes the concept of empathy into a narrow 
mathematical corset taken from individual decision making under uncertainty and not clearly 
relevant for social decisions. 
 My position is that voting theory is distinct from ethics in the sense that there cannot be 
any control over the votes that are cast to determine if they are ethical or not. The aggregation 
of votes may well be considered from an ethical viewpoint, but the evaluation of individual 
preferences is beyond the scope of voting theory. 
 In classical utilitarianism the utilitarian decision rule was advanced as a fundamental 
ethical principle, for which no further justification was either needed, or available. In my 
view, if the argument involving the veil of ignorance is to carry conviction beyond postulating 
utilitarianism directly, it must involve a straight forward application of expected utility 
maximization based on the deciding individual’s own utility function. A similar position was 
taken by Rae (1969) and Taylor (1969) who also used the veil of ignorance argument. They 
considered the choice between two alternatives on the basis of a 2-valued scale and arrived at 
majority rule. Had they considered an arbitrary number of alternatives, while retaining the 2-
valued scale, they would have discovered AV. The general case, with an arbitrary number of 
alternatives is considered below.  
 Assume that the members of a constitutional convention, hereafter called electors, have to 
decide, possibly among other issues, on a voting rule. Each elector is perfectly selfish, solely 
interested in how he himself will fare in future elections, as measured by her expected utility. 
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The utility experienced by the ith voter in a future election given that the jth alternative is 
chosen is the score  on her ballot, taken from the relevant voting scale. ijs
 Let N be the number of voters in a future election. The elector assumes that any of the 
ballots cast in that election could, with equal probability 1/ , reflect her preferences in that 





N ∑ , the average utility of the jth outcome. Let h be the alternative that maximizes this 
expression: 
 1 1max( )ih iji is jN N
=∑ ∑ s
                                                
. 
Alternative h, that maximizes the electors expected utility is by definition the UV winner. 
This argument holds with regard to any election in which the elector may participate at some 
future time. UV is the election method that a rational utility maximizing elector would prefer. 
If all electors are expected utility maximizers and are able to understand the consequences of 
their choice, they will unanimously choose UV. 
 Implicit in this argumentation is not Harsanyi’s assumption of an elector’s serial identity 
with all voters of a future election, but rather an assumption of similarity of tastes, or values 
among the members of a society. If in a future election, alternative a gets twice as many votes 
as alternative b, then by assumption, the elector will be twice as likely to vote for a than for b. 
A similarity of tastes and values may be regarded as a defining characteristic of a society, as 
distinct from a random collection of individuals. 
 This derivation, based on self interest only, clearly differs from the previous section where 
the utilitarian rule was simply postulated as a fundamental ethical principle. The argument 
involving the veil of ignorance is also distinct from Harsanyi’s axiomatic derivation of a 
utilitarian SWF. That derivation gave rise to a literature that focuses on the intermingling of 
differences in tastes and differences in beliefs in shaping the differences in individual 
choices.1 It would be interesting to have an analysis along these lines of the choice from 
behind the veil of ignorance. 
 The connection between choice under uncertainty and voting that is provided by 
conception of voting behind a curtain of ignorance can be exploited to analyses other voting 
procedures as well. The minimax rule of decision theory corresponds to anti-plurality voting 
in which the alternative with the fewest negative votes is chosen. PV corresponds to a 
maximax rule of maximizing the probability of the largest gain, regardless of risk. This would 
appear to be another major flaw of PV.  
11. AXIOMATIC DERIVATIONS OF UV 
In this section I discuss two axiomatic systems that can be easily applied to UV. May (1952) 
postulated four conditions to derive MR for the case of two alternatives.2 I reformulate these 
slightly so that they can be related to UV, which satisfied them easily. The following 
subsection considers a set of conditions due to d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) that is 
necessary and sufficient to establish a utilitarian SWF. 
11.1 May’s conditions 
Decisiveness: The voting rule produces a definite outcome for any pattern of individual 
 preferences. 
Anonymity: The outcome depends only on the votes cast, and not on which voter cast which 
 vote. 
 
1 A recent contribution is Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004). 
2 An exposition of May’s result can also be found in Mueller (2003, 133-136). 
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Neutrality: If two alternatives receive the same total score, they have the same outcome. 
Positive responsiveness: If a voter increases his score for some alternative, then the outcome 
 for that alternative cannot be worse. 
That these conditions are satisfied by UV is trivial; I have not been able to extended May’s 
proof of sufficiency from MR to the case of UV. 
11.2 The conditions of d’Aspremont and Gevers 
d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) presented a set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient 
for a cardinal SWF.1 I reinterpret these to fit the assumption that preferences are expressed as 
scores on a ballot. There is some overlap between these conditions and those of May. 
 
Universal domain (UD): This is the same as May’s decisiveness. 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): The choice from any subset of alternatives is 
 independent of the preferences over alternatives outside that subset. 
Unanimity (U): If each voter gives a higher score to alternative a, than to alternative b, then a 
 must be socially preferred to b.  
Anonymity (A): Any permutation of ballots among voters leaves the result unchanged. 
Positive linear transformation (PLT): A transformation of individual utilities of the form 
 , 0 , where b is identical over all voters, does not change the outcome. i ia bu b+ >
i
                                                
 
 d’Aspremont and Grevers demonstrate that in their formulation these assumptions imply a 
utilitarian SWF of the form . iw u=∑
 Instead of PLT, I assume Condition VS. This assumption is stronger than PLT, since now 
.  ,ia a= ∀
 Given the five assumption, the utilitarian SWF is simply UV, since the individual utilities 
are in this case the scores assigned by voters to the alternatives. That UV satisfies all 
conditions is easily checked. I omit the proof of necessity, given by d’Aspremont and Grevers 
for the more general case based on PLT. 
12. PREFERENCE DISTORTION AND STRATEGIC VOTING IN TRADITIONAL 
VOTING SYSTEMS 
The choice of one out of several alternatives may depend not only on how good the chosen 
alternative is, but also on how bad the others are. The alternatives to UV are the traditional 
voting methods. Their flaws have been much discussed in the literature and the search for 
superior alternatives has been a principal motivation of voting theory. They are of three kinds: 
The first occurs when voters cast sincere votes, expressing their true preferences as well as 
they can be expressed under a given voting system. The second involves strategic voting 
when voters deliberately cast votes that do not reflect their true preferences. The third has to 
do with the fact that a given voting rule may prevent voters from expressing their true 
preferences. 
 How can a possible outcome of a voting system be evaluated? The theory of this paper 
suggests that the best outcome is the candidate who would win a utilitarian vote (utilitarian 
winner), the worst is the candidate getting the worst score in a utilitarian vote (utilitarian 
loser). The Condorcet criterion (CC) is the one most often used in the literature. The best 
candidate here is the Condorcet winner, who wins all binary contest; the worst is the 
Condorcet loser, who loses all binary contests. Neither a Condorcet winner, nor a Condorcet 
loser, always exist. In the following example, the Condorcet winner exists and is identical 
 
1 Sen (1986, p.1125) also discusses the result. 
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with the utilitarian winner; the Condorcet looser also exists and is identical with the utilitarian 
loser. For the purpose of evaluation I use the following definition: 
 
A ‘best’ candidate is one who wins under both UV and CC and a ‘worst’ candidate is one 
who loses under both UV and CC. 
 
 
The Flaw of PV: 
Under PV the best candidate may receive the fewest votes and the worst candidate the most 
votes. 
 
 The statement is illustrated by the following example: 
 
Table 5.1: The Worst Candidate Wins, the Best Loses 
Preference abc cba bca 
No. of Voters 35 30 20 
EV Score 1, 0, -1 -1, 0, 1 -1, 1, 0 
 
 The first row of the table shows the preference orderings of three groups of voters, the 
second their number. The third row shows the utilitarian vote of each group on the three-
valued EV scale. These scores always relate to the abc ordering. 
 The results of pair wise contests are: ba(50/40), ca(50/40), bc(60/30), so that b always 
wins, a always looses. The aggregate score for the EV vote is (-15, 20, -5) so that again b is 
the winner, a the looser. In a PV election, the total scores are (35, 20, 30) so that a, the worst 
candidate wins. 
 The most prominent attempts at avoiding, or at least ameliorating, the defects of single 
stage voting systems are multiple stage voting systems. The most popular is plurality voting 
with a runoff (PVR) in which the two candidates with the most votes face each other. Another 
method, widely practiced in the English speaking world is the Hare system, or single 
transferable vote (STV). Originally it was proposed for elections in which several candidates 
from a single district are to be elected to an assembly; only the case where a single candidate 
is to be elected will be discussed here. Each round of STV is a PV leading either to the 
election of a majority candidate, or the elimination of the candidate with the fewest votes. The 
election stops when there is a majority winner. A computerized version of STV, called instant 
transferable vote (ITV), has been gaining in the U.S. Here voters state the order of their first 
three preferences, with successive rounds of voting being simulated on the computer. 
 The following statement shows that neither PVR nor STV remedy the basic flaw of PV 
 
The Flaw of PVSR and STV: 
The worst candidate may win under either PVR or STV. 
 
 Continuing the above example, we see that the best candidate, b, is eliminated in the first 
round under either PVR or STV. Under both voting rules, the worst candidate, a, faces c in 
the second round and wins by 35/20. 
 A second defect of traditional voting methods is the incentive they provide for strategic 
voting, involving a deliberate misrepresentation of voter preferences. It is a common 
observation that voters do not ‘waste’ their vote on a candidate with little or no chance of 
being elected. Under PV this means that they will vote for the candidate they prefer among 
those having a chance to win. This leads to an extreme preference distortion since the best 
liked and the worst liked candidate get the same 0 score. With a BC, preferred candidates are 
moved down the preference ranking to make room for less favored candidates with better 
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winning chances. Strategic voting under traditional voting rules is seen to lead to preference 
reversal, meaning that less preferred candidates may receive higher scores than more 
preferred candidates. 
 Preference reversal is a consequence of the fact that traditional voting methods restrict 
voters ability to express their preferences on a given scale. Under PV, a voter who for 
strategic reasons votes for his second choice, can no longer vote for his first choice. Under 
UV, there is no restriction on how a voter may vote under a given scale. If, for strategic 
reasons, a voter elevates his score for his second best candidate, he need not lower the score 
of the first best. There is no incentive for a preference reversal under UV. 
 The final source of preference distortion has to do with the fact that a given voting scale 
may not allow the voter to express as differentiated a judgment as he wishes. If, for example, 
a voter wishes to differentiate between those candidates about whom he feels positive, neutral, 
or negative, then a two valued voting scale does not allow him to express these judgments. 
13. WHICH UV RULE? 
A decision for UV leaves open the precise scale to be used. I believe that this choice should 
be regarded as a pragmatic issue to be decided by experimenting with the principal scales that 
have been proposed. Nevertheless, I offer my thoughts on this subject here by reviewing the 
principal choices. 
 
AV: Extensive justifications for AV were given by Brams and Fishburn (1983) and more 
recently in by Weber (1995), as well as by Brams and Sanver (2005). Brams and Fishburn 
(2003) discuss their efforts at getting AV adopted, as well as attempting an evaluation of AV 
in those instances where it was used. 
  At the core of the arguments presented is the assumption that preferences are 
dichotomous. This means that the voter puts each of the alternatives facing him into one of 
two classes: those of whom he approves and those of whom he disapproves. If this 
assumption is correct, the AV is the simplest and best voting rule.  
 I am skeptical regarding the assumption of dichotomous preferences. It is a common 
experience that in addition to feeling positive or negative about candidates or issues, we may 
also feel neutral. The examples of common scales for aggregating judgments given in Section 
8 typically use a scale with 5 or 6 values. These examples may involve more information than 
a voter has in a general election; but they do suggest that a two-valued scale may be too 
narrow. A psychological shortcoming of AV is that it does not allow voters the satisfaction of 
explicitly voting against a disliked candidate, or issue. 
 
RV: Here the intent is clearly to allow voters a wide choice of possible scores in a given 
range. Smith (2000), the principal theoretical paper advocating RV, assumes that the score 
can be any number in the interval (0, 1). However, in an empirical study of RV, Smith, 
Quintal and Greene (2005) used the interval (0, 100). No explanation of the change was 
given, but it does seem more practicable to deal with whole numbers than with decimals. 
Following the 2004 US presidential election, the authors’ conducted an exit poll by asking 
122 respondents for the RV scores of 7 major and minor party candidates. From their analysis 
of the responses, they tried to determine among other things an optimal scale. From the fact 
that some voters used numbers that were multiples of 5, but not of ten, the authors’ conclude 
that a scale with 20 values is desired by voters. This is not convincing, since these numbers 
may have been 25, 50, 75, suggesting a 4-valued scale. Also, I feel that experiments with 
different scales are needed, rather than trying to infer the optimal scale from votes on the 100 
point scale. 
 The paper has some interesting findings that should be explored further. The mean scores 
of the major candidates where rather close to the scores of the same candidates on an AV 
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scale that was also tested. This raises the issue of how much difference a more differentiated 
scale actually makes to the outcome. Only a minority utilized the full range of the scale, 
suggesting that they voted sincerely, rather than strategically.  
 
EV: Feldenthal (1989) analyzed this method as a combination of approval and disapproval 
voting. He concluded that with strategic voting in a small group EV reduces to AV. I 
proposed EV in Hillinger (2004a, 2004b) EV is intermediate between AV and RV. My 
motivation for advocating EV has been twofold. I feel that the 2-valued range of AV voting is 
not discriminating enough and that voters desire the emotional satisfaction of being able to 
directly vote against as well as for a candidate. I also feel that compared to the examples in 
Section 8 that use a 5, or 6 point scale, voters are generally less informed and hence less able 
to discriminate.  
 Direct evidence on this issue is provided by voting in committees. Here the voting 
generally proceeds issue by issue, or amendment by amendment. Members are asked to vote 
for, against, or abstain. An abstention in a committee is not comparable to staying home in a 
general election because of lack of interest, or because the voter thinks that he will have no 
effect on the outcome. The committee member who abstains is physically present and knows 
that his vote can make a difference. He abstains because he is neutral, rather than positive or 
negative about the issue being voted on. The fact that a committee vote typically includes 
some abstentions indicates a willingness to utilize a 3-point scale. 
14. UTILITARIAN VOTING IN THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE 
This section is based on the interesting article by Lines (1986), but has a somewhat different 
interpretation of the facts that she describes. Lines describes the electoral procedures used by 
the Venetian oligarchy to elect their dogi. They were in effect from 1268 to 1789, the last 
election before the conquest by Napoleon and thus in one of the longest lasting and successful 
republics of history. The total voting process was extremely complicated, involving many 
rounds of elimination, either by vote or by lot. The interpretation that suggests itself is that 
this was a design to make it impossible to predict the outcome and thus to avoid the usual 
wheeling and dealing by which parties usually try to influence the outcome. In the following I 
will discuss solely the voting procedures employed. 
 Lines, as reflected in her title, regards the voting procedures as AV. This is not quite 
correct. For one, she cites the historian Maranini to the effect that in some election three 
different balls could be cast into the urn, signifying favor, contrariness and doubt. In some 
elections ‘doubt’ meant a need for more discussion and a postponement of the election. In 
other cases the ‘doubt’ vote was simply not counted as the election proceeded. This is clearly 
EV rather than AV. 
 Even the probably more usual case, in which only two different balls, signifying ‘yes’, or 
‘no’, were available is not equivalent to the contemporary definition of AV. Under AV, the 
voter actively selects the candidates of whom she approves and ignores the rest. Under the 
Venetian rules, a negative vote must actually be cast, just as a positive vote. More 
importantly, a negative vote had more weight than a positive vote. Two negative votes out of 
a total of nine constituted a veto. 
 The Venetian system was utilitarian in the sense that all available scores could always be 
used in relation to all candidates. It deviated from pure utilitarianism through the introduction 
of an element of veto power. In contrast to the risk maximizing PV, Venetians were risk 




15. CONCLUSION  
The paper advances a number of positive arguments in favor of utilitarian voting. The most 
fundamental argument is the criterion of unrestricted consumer sovereignty. There is no 
justification for restricting voters’ ability to evaluate alternatives by means of a given voting 
scale. I also argued that the fact that UV does not satisfy Arrow’s criterion of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives is not a valid criticism. 
The criticism of traditional voting methods is sharpened by showing that the most widely 
used methods may elect the worst candidate under both the utilitarian and Condorcet criteria.  
I believe that further progress on voting rules, particularly the selection of an appropriate 
scale, calls above all for empirical and experimental studies of voter behavior under different 
rules. In this connection it is interesting to note that the past several decades have seen the 
evolution of a substantial engineering literature on ‘voting’ by information processing 
machines and software. In contrast to the political theory of voting, this literature is largely 
empirical, examining the performance of different voting rules in practice. Contributors to this 
literature recognize that the problems that they deal with are similar to those encountered in 
political voting. 1 An influence from the empirical approach of the engineers on the political 
theory of voting would be salutary. 
 
                                                 
1 For a review see Parhani (2005) 
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